The SAST tool that reads your pull requests like an attacker.
Pattern rules flag a line. IonWarp's Security Review follows the change through your code and names who could abuse it and what they would get: a tenant leak, an injected command, a secret sent to a model. It lands in the same GitHub comment as Code Review, with a fix prompt for your coding agent.
IonWarp caught it Qodo, Greptile, CodeRabbit and Cursor Bugbot missed it
IonWarpbotcommented on line 26
P2Embed endpoint's only gate is the caller-supplied Referer header · Security Review
GET /embed/best is unauthenticated and its sole control against third-party embedding is `URI(request.referer).host != SiteSetting.embeddable_host`. Referer is a request header a client sets freely, so any HTTP client (or a script running on the embeddable host) can send `Referer: http://<embeddable_host>/` and still get the embed page with `X-Frame-Options: ALLOWALL`, defeating the single-host restriction. The embed_url query parameter itself is never validated against the allowed host on this read path (only the background retrieval validates it), so any existing TopicEmbed row is reachable even if its URL is on a feed-provided host.
MediumKnown issue in the Security Review benchmark · caught by DeepSeek V4.1 FlashSee the graded case
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52security P0/P1 findings fixedIonWarp's own pull requests, Aug 27 – Nov 2
$0.04model cost of one reviewAI Architecture · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash · 58 s
Security findings from IonWarp's own pull requests
Catches the query that reads every customer's rows
A comma-joined table after a JOIN slipped past a workspace scope rewrite, so a key that could read one workspace could read every workspace's device data. The finding named the query, who could abuse it and what they would get; the coding agent fixed it in round 1.
A deploy workflow put a caller's `sha` input into a shell command unquoted, in a step that holds the deploy keys. The finding showed why the script's own check came too late: the shell expands the input first.
A new pass read a repository's deploy config files into a prompt for an outside model and redacted only the answer, so any credential in those files went to the model provider. A pattern scanner has no rule for that; the fix moved redaction before the prompt.
A path guard collapsed `..` before it resolved symlinks, so a symlink could read files outside the checkout. Security Review named the path and how to close it.
Every finding carries a fix prompt for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex. The GitHub App only reads your code, so it never pushes: your agent pushes the fix, and IonWarp re-reviews and strikes the finding through as Autofixed, or keeps it open.
Every review comment ends with a table of the reviewers that ran: the model each used, what it found, what it cost and how long it took. The review shown took 115 s and 76 credits.
Competitor facts are from each vendor's own pages, dated in the sources below. “Not listed” means the vendor's pages name no such feature; prices are for 5 developers on the team plan each price cell names.
P2Embed endpoint's only gate is the caller-supplied Referer header · Security Review
GET /embed/best is unauthenticated and its sole control against third-party embedding is `URI(request.referer).host != SiteSetting.embeddable_host`. Referer is a request header a client sets freely, so any HTTP client (or a script running on the embeddable host) can send `Referer: http://<embeddable_host>/` and still get the embed page with `X-Frame-Options: ALLOWALL`, defeating the single-host restriction. The embed_url query parameter itself is never validated against the allowed host on this read path (only the background retrieval validates it), so any existing TopicEmbed row is reachable even if its URL is on a feed-provided host.